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American Poetry Wax Museum's application of Bennett’s exhibitionary com­
plex is a useful companion and corrective to monolithic works like David 
Perkins’s two-volume A History o f Modern Poetry and it is a clear statement 
of some of the aesthetic and political concerns informing the works of such 
poets as Susan Howe, Charles Bernstein, and Nathaniel Mackey.
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Perloff’s Wittgenstein’s Ladder explores the ladder metaphor in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (postulate #6.54)—
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who under­
stands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he 
has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He 
must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.)
—  as the basis of a “distinctively Wittgensteinian poetics” whose character­
istics include an emphasis on linguistic “dailyness,” a suspicion of “theory it­
self as an imposition on practice,” and a belief in iterative “difference” in 
which “[repetition . . . always entails a shift in context as well as in use” 
(xiv). Perloff claims that passages in Wittgenstein’s notebooks and other 
writings that appear tautologous, like “The world of the happy is a happy 
world,” amount to a “foregrounding of syntactic difference [that] is closer to 
avant-garde writing than to the style of [Russell’s] The Principia 
Mathematical’ (44). Instead the “sudden break, the lack of connection, be­
tween two kinds of operation” constitutes a “uniquely Wittgensteinian” writ­
ing practice that contains a “note of irresolution” which belies the claims of 
those like Adorno who see Wittgenstein’s famous aphorism—“Whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”—as little more than a “gesture of 
reverent authoritarian authenticity” (12). Perloff claims that this is instead a 
“commonsense recognition that there are metaphysical and ethical aporias 
that no discussion . . . can fully rationalize” (12). She later links the appari­
tion of these aporias in Wittgenstein’s writing practices to the dailyness men­
tioned above through Victor Shklovsky’s notion of defamiliarization:
Wittgenstein’s ordinary is best understood as quite simply 
that which is, the language we do actually use when we 
communicate with one another. In this sense, the ordinary 
need not be literal, denotative, propositional, neutral, refer­
ential . . . .  On the contrary, our actual language may well 
be connotative, metaphoric, fantastic, the issue being quite
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Perloff then applies this Wittgensteinian poetics to the texts of Gertrude 
Stein, Samuel Beckett, Thomas Bernhard, Ingeborg Bachmann, Lyn Hejinian, 
and other (radical) modernists. Perloff’s findings seem most useful in that 
they propose a departure from a method of literary interpretation and creation 
analogous to Bertrand Russell’s analytical and symbolical philosophy. In­
stead she proposes a method similar to her vision of Wittgenstein’s philoso­
phy, which is more in keeping with the needs and interests of Language writ­
ing and the New American Poetry of the 1960s-70s, and that proceeds to ex­
press the “mystical” and “inexpressible”—the strangeness of the ordinary— 
by demonstrating the “strangeness of everyday words” by decontextualizing 
them (182, 183).
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simply whether and in what context people use it. (57)
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